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ECO557 Merket Design syllabus.pdfECO557 Merket Design syllabus.pdf

In many problems of resource allocation, using the price system may encounter practical, legal, or ethical objections. In this course, we consider economic allocation problems in which traditional markets with the price system would not function properly, or even not exist, and study how to design allocation systems in which desirable properties, such as efficiency, stability, and/or strategy-proofness are satisfied.

 

 

References:

  • A. Roth (2015) “Who Gets What – and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design” HMH
  • A. Roth and M. Sotomayer (1989) “Two-Sided Matching Markets” Cambridge U. Press
  • P. Milgrom (2004) “Putting Auction Theory to Work” Cambridge U. Press
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