This course provides an introduction to non-cooperative game theory, which is a fundamental tool to analyze a variety of strategic interactions, such as individuals within organizations, firms competing in markets, political parties in competition and nations engaged in international negotiations. Our course contains rigorous mathematical descriptions of fundamental tools in game theory, as well as a variety of concrete applications to economic context of strategic interactions, such as imperfect competition, information transmission and mechanism design. Students will learn to master game-theoretical concepts, tools and results used in modern microeconomics.
Final Exam:
3 hours, closed-book exam
Textbooks
- Osborne, Rubinstein (1994) “A Course in Game Theory” MIT Press. Chapters 1-3, 6, 8, 11, 12
- Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995) “Microeconomic Theory” Oxford University Press. Chapters 7, 8, 9, 13, 14
Other References
- Myerson (1991) “Game Theory” Harvard University Press.
- Schelling (1960) “Strategy of Conflict” Oxford U. Press
- Kreps (1990) “Game Theory and Economic Modelling” Oxford U. Press
- Teaching coordinator: Ahsue Mary-Joyce
- Teaching coordinator: Gossner Olivier
- Teaching coordinator: Koriyama Yukio
- Teaching coordinator: Pandevant Arnaud
- Teaching coordinator: Tamura Yuki
- Teaching coordinator: Zheng Yiyun